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Abstract: In this paper, the preference reversal phenomenon known from risk research is investigated 
according to which subjects prefer gamble A over B in competitive decisions although they reveal 
higher valuations in terms of a cash equivalent (CE) or a willingness to pay (WTP) for the latter when 
gambles are assessed separately in monadic judgments. In contrast to the experimental settings of 
research on risky choices, our studies observed unforced and binding purchase decisions of 
experienced consumers between real products in natural shopping environments. Results confirm 
robustness of preference reversals in risk-free purchase decisions indicating that orderings of product 
preferences reverse significantly between evaluations in monadic and competitive designs. While 
recent pricing research has been largely focused on monadic designs and suggested BDM mechanisms 
or second-price auctions for elicitations of consumers’ true willingness to pay, results of our studies 
indicate a substantial discrepancy between preference orders based on monadic judgments and 
preferences that consumers reveal in competitive purchase decisions.  
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21 Introduction
One of the major responsibilities of marketing managers in manufacturing industries, retailing and 
services is the pricing and positioning of products. Basically, pricing policies of business companies 
have to be supported by internal information, e.g. cost structures or strategic directions, and external 
information about specific market characteristics such as price positioning of competing companies. 
However, probably the biggest part in price setting and price optimization is to determine the 
particular value (utility) a product delivers to the consumer.  
 In this context, the reservation price concept has received considerable use for the pricing 
research and pricing policies of marketers during recent decades. This concept hypothesizes that 
consumers form and memorize internal evaluation standards in terms of the maximum prices they are 
willing to pay for a given quality of a product which are identical to consumers’ product values and 
utilities, respectively. As for buying decisions between different products in shopping environments, 
consumers are assumed to compare current selling prices to reservation prices, construct a preference 
order of products in terms of decreasing differentials (net utilities) between reservation and selling 
prices, and choose the product with the highest net utility or consumer surplus (Kalish and Nelson 
1991)1.
 Researchers agree on the point that consumers’ true reservation price or willingness to pay 
(termed hereafter WTP) is basically unobservable and influenced by current needs of consumers at the 
time of the particular decision. Therefore, the individual WTP is assumed to be a situation-specific 
construct rather than a memorized and stable evaluation standard (Voelckner 2006). Moreover, recent 
research suggests that the WTP is more accurately represented as a range than as a single price point 
(Wang, Venkatesh and Chatterjee 2007). Thus, the identification of valid measurements and elicitation 
methods which come at least as close as possible to consumers’ true WTP or ranges of WTP remains a 
challenging task in pricing research. Literature on the topic provides different classifications of the 
broad variety of applied methods and approaches for determining the WTP, for instance price-related 
vs. price-centered methods (Blamires 1998), direct vs. indirect approaches (Voelckner 2006), or 
methods based on stated preferences, observed purchases, and bidding data (Sattler and Nitschke 
2003).  
3 Apart from that, in examining the setting of WTP-elicitations in particular, one can distinguish 
between two different design types. First, there are monadic designs in terms of separate evaluations. 
A potential customer is presented with a single product and the WTP is determined using so-called 
open-ended or closed-ended (referendum) approaches (Keane 1997). Monadic designs either elicit the 
WTP hypothetically without financial consequences for subjects or require real economic 
commitments such as incentive compatible second-price auctions or BDM lotteries (McAfee and 
McMillian 1987; Vickrey 1961; Becker, deGroot and Marshak 1964). Regarding BDM-based WTP 
elicitations, subjects are asked in an open-ended approach to indicate the highest price they would be 
willing to pay for a single product whereas the actual selling price is determined at random. Subjects 
are obliged to buy the product when the stated WTP exceeds or equals the selling price. In second-
price auctions, subjects represent competing bidders and are similarly supposed to reveal their true 
value of the product in terms of a reasonable bid when the product is auctioned off. The winner is 
determined by the highest bid whereas the selling price is specified by the second highest bid of all 
participants.
 Secondly, there are competitive designs in terms of joint evaluations where for instance, real 
in-store purchases of consumers between products are observed in field experiments (e.g. test market 
or store tests). Moreover, competitive designs are frequently used in experimental buying simulations 
where consumers are asked to make hypothetical or binding decisions between two or more products 
of a given choice set (subsets of assortments or categories) in laboratory environments (Voelckner 
2006). As an example, a widely used competitive design in laboratory-based pricing research is the 
brand-price-tradeoff approach. In this multistage design, subjects are asked to choose a brand of a 
relevant subset. Initially, each brand is offered at the minimum of a range of market prices or 
particular test prices in the first stage. In the next stage, the price of the chosen brand is changed by a 
constant or variable increment whereas prices of all other brands remain unchanged. This procedure 
continues from stage to stage until the participant refuses to buy any of the brands, hence indicating 
that each brand-specific WTP is exceeded (Blamires 1987). In addition, standard preference-based, 
adaptive, and choice-based conjoint measurements are widely used in laboratory-based pricing 
research (Wittink, Krishnamurtu and Reibstein 1989; Kalish and Nelson 1991). Based on elicited 
4preference orders between product profiles, estimations of part worth of attribute levels (such as 
prices) allow for predictions of product values (utilities), choice likelihoods, and consumers’ response 
to the particular price levels under test.  
 Recent pricing research focused largely on WTP-measurements in monadic designs (e.g. 
Rutström 1998, Frykblom 2000, Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002; Sattler and Nitschke 2003; Noussair, 
Robin and Ruffieux 2004; Voelckner 2006). Specifically, researchers propose binding monadic 
designs such as the BDM mechanism or second-price auctions when consumers’ situation-specific true 
WTP for a particular product is to be elicited (Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002; Voelckner 2006). As for 
predictions of preference orders and buying behavior when several competing products are offered 
simultaneously at any prices, standard models of rational choice are usually applied. Based on elicited 
reservation prices (i.e. consumers’ WTP) for each relevant alternative, product-specific net utilities are 
transformed into individual buying probabilities using for instance, first choice or attraction models 
(Luce 1959). Thus, given that competing products are offered at equal prices, products with higher 
WTP are predicted to deliver greater net utilities and become more likely to be chosen by subjects.  
However, research in experimental economics revealed that subjects’ preference orders 
between options can change significantly, depending on whether a competitive (joint evaluation of 
options) or monadic elicitation design (separate judgment of options) is applied. This violation of main 
assumptions of the standard theory of rational choice originates from work on risky decisions and is 
termed preference reversal (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971). Numerous laboratory-based studies on 
preference reversal revealed that subjects often prefer a gamble A over gamble B when they are asked 
to select one of them in a competitive environment although they are willing to pay more for the latter 
(lottery B) when gambles are evaluated separately in monadic judgments.  
Therefore, a question arises whether preference reversals (termed hereafter PR) generalize 
from choices on gambles and lotteries to risk-free decisions and occur even when regular buyers 
purchase products in environments that relate near real market-like settings. On the supposition that 
consumers’ preference orders between products depend on whether monadic or competitive designs 
are applied, a serious problem of pricing research becomes apparent. If a subject reveals a higher WTP 
for product A than for product B in monadic judgments, she is assumed to prefer A over B when both 
5products are offered at equal prices in a competitive environment. However, when the preference 
reversal phenomenon persists in decisions between real products, predictions based on consumers’ 
WTP elicited in monadic designs could be misleading, especially when standard models of rational 
choice are used. Hence, the potential of gathered information could be limited to some extent which is 
a drawback especially when managers’ decisions about price positioning of products, product lines, 
and assortments are to be supported.  
To investigate this research problem, our studies tested the robustness of preference reversals in 
risk-free decisions in natural shopping environments. Therefore, we compared monadic judgments in 
terms of separate elicitations of consumers’ product values with consumers’ preference orders between 
products elicited in competitive purchase decisions. For ensuring a sufficient degree of realism, 
binding and unforced buying decisions of experienced consumers between fast-moving consumer 
goods were observed in a laboratory (study one) and a field environment (study two). 
2 Preference Reversals in Behavioral Research 
Background and Literature Review 
In marketing literature, the term preference reversal is generally used in the broadest sense to indicate 
a change in preference that is induced by behavioral anomalies, hence violating standard valuation 
theory. Research on behavioral anomalies has a long tradition in marketing literature and the reversal 
of preferences has been studied extensively in various scenarios. For example, preference reversals are 
caused by what was termed context effects, which describe a change in preferences (choices) between 
alternatives when the choice set is enlarged or reduced by options that are inferior, extreme, or in 
compromise positions (e.g. Huber, Payne and Puto 1982; Simonson 1989; Sinn et. al. 2007). Findings 
of empirical studies on that topic suggest that whenever the complexity of choice tasks is increased, 
for example by adding more options, preferences can change and are assumed to be significantly 
reconstructed at the time of decision instead of being an immutable underlying structure stored in the 
memory of subjects (Simonson and Tversky 1992; Drolet et. al 2000).  
 In contrast to this previous work in marketing literature, our study investigates preference 
reversals in terms of a behavioral phenomenon described in risk research, where values of gambles, 
6bets, and lotteries are elicited. The classical example includes a so-called P-bet (a lottery with a high 
probability of winning a modest cash amount) and a $-bet in terms of a more risky lottery with a small 
chance to win a very large amount of money. Preference reversal means that the preference for choices 
in terms of preferring the P-bet or the $-bet is different than the separately elicited monetary values for 
the gambles regarding cash or certainty equivalents might suggest. Certainty equivalents are 
considered a stated sure payoff for which a subject is indifferent between receiving a gamble or the 
stated sure amount of money. The preference order of the participant is said to be reflected in the 
certainty equivalents, meaning the higher the certainty equivalent, the higher the individual’s value of 
a gamble. This way, different gambles with differing monetary payoffs and probabilities are 
comparable. As an example, a so-called ‘standard’ preference reversal exists, when the P-bet has a 
lower certainty equivalent than the $-bet, but is preferred when the subject is asked to select one of the 
two gambles offered (Braga, Humphrey and Starmer 2009).  
 A widely accepted explanation for preference reversals in risk research is a violation of 
procedure invariance that is a main assumption of the standard theory of rational choice. Procedure 
invariance stipulates that the preference between options does not depend on the elicitation method. In 
contrast, since the percentage of subjects who reveal preference reversals in laboratory-based 
economic experiments on risky choices is generally between twenty and fifty percent, a strong 
discrepancy of subjects’ behavior in monadic pricing tasks and competitive choice tasks is detected, 
often due to a different weighting of the main attributes of lottery options such as winning 
probabilities and cash payments (Tversky et al. 1990; Shu 2006).  
 More recent work in experimental economics extends investigations of the PR phenomenon to 
hypothetical risk-free settings. However, findings confirm that preference reversals occur even in a 
variety of economic decisions when competitive and monadic evaluations of options are compared 
(Bazerman et al. 1999). For instance, an experimental study shows that a superior product bundle (a 
particular baseball card set) is chosen in a choice task, but is valued less in terms of a smaller WTP 
when elicited separately in an auction (List 2002). Furthermore, several studies identified preference 
reversals in categories of consumer durables (e.g. television, cordless phone, microwave oven, toaster) 
when participants make hypothetical decisions between two competing brands or determine a purchase 
7likelihood when the alternatives are evaluated separately (Nowlis and Simonson 1997). That means, 
that preference reversals remain a highly replicable phenomenon even for hypothetical risk-free two-
attribute choices, hence demonstrating a significant difference in underlying decision processes in 
general when preferences are elicited in competitive or monadic evaluation designs (Hawkins 1994; 
Braga, Humphrey and Starmer 2009).  
Contribution of the paper  
While a major objective in pricing research is to identify appropriate methods for measuring the 
willingness to pay in terms of coming as close as possible to the consumer’s true value of a particular 
product (Voelckner 2006), this paper addresses a more fundamental question: regardless of the 
specific elicitation technique applied, will participants’ preference order of alternatives remain 
unchanged when alternatives are evaluated in a monadic or in a competitive design? Previous studies 
mainly examined the PR anomaly in hypothetical, and to a considerable extent, artificial and complex 
framings, hence facilitating behavioral anomalies (e.g. Hsee et al. 1999). In contrast, we deliberately 
intended to increase the degree of realism and to reduce the cognitive complexity of the whole 
decision environment in both of our studies.  
 Concerning the elicitation of product values and preference orders, simple choice tasks for 
both monadic as well as competitive designs were applied for the purpose of ensuring at least a basic 
level of procedure consistency. Thus, in monadic evaluations, subjects were presented with a sequence 
of choice tasks between an amount of money and a particular product (study one) or with a sequence 
of choice tasks between a product offered at different prices and a no-buy option (study two). Further, 
a random payoff mechanism (RPM), described in detail in the next section was implemented for 
ensuring incentive compatibility of subjects’ decisions. Since both choice tasks as well as RPM are 
comprehensible and assumed to induce no mental cognitive overload, we avoided biasing effects being 
caused by the participants not fully understanding decision tasks or incentive mechanisms (such as 
BDM or second-price auctions) as intensely discussed in previous research on the topic (Hsee 1996; 
Kagel and Levin 1993; Reilly 1982). 
 Furthermore, previous research confirmed that real market environment settings can 
significantly reduce the observed percentage of preference reversals (Cox and Grether 1996)1 under 
8certain circumstances, thus suggesting that the phenomenon may be less robust in environments that 
are essentially of central concern in economics (Braga, Humphrey and Starmer 2009). In order to 
examine this finding, we increased the degree of realism in both of our studies. Hence, we applied 
framings that adapt to the natural consumer environments in terms of binding decisions between real 
products in a laboratory environment (study one) and additionally conducted a standard field survey at 
the point of purchase (study two).  
3 Study One
Experimental design 
The first experiment was conducted in a laboratory environment at a German university2. In a within-
subject design, a sample of 58 students from different fields of study was recruited. Only frequent 
buyers of three fast-moving consumer good categories (chocolate bar, toothpaste, shampoo) with a 
sufficient brand familiarity and buying experience were considered. Based on market observations and 
numerous pretests, we selected two top-selling brands (Twix vs. Duplo, Dentagard vs. Colgate, Herbal 
Essences vs. Elvital) of each category for reason of ensuring sufficient response amongst participants. 
The experiment was run as a paper and pencil questionnaire. It consisted of three parts and 117 
relevant decisions in total. For ensuring economic consequences and incentive compatibility, a random 
payoff mechanism (RPM) was applied. Before the experiment started, each subject was instructed that 
at the end of the session one of her decisions was determined at random to become binding which is a 
standard payoff mechanism for eliciting preferences in general and preference reversals in particular. 
Previous research findings confirm that the RPM induces independence of each decision of a subject 
in the experiment, hence avoiding income or portfolio effects which are assumed to bias choice 
behavior in sequential multistage decisions (Grether and Plott 1979; Braga, Humphrey and Starmer 
2009).
 In the first part of the experiment, subjects were asked in several decisions to choose between 
a certain product and an amount of money. Thus, in accordance with designs applied in research on 
reversals in risky choices between gambles, consumers’ product values in terms of a cash equivalent 
for each of the six products under test were elicited. The amount of cash changed in each decision and 
9represented sixteen test prices clustered around the regular market price of the products. The sequence 
of cash amounts varied at random in each questionnaire to avoid starting point bias (Mitchell and 
Carson 1989). It has to be pointed out that product values were derived from the lowest cash 
equivalent a subject accepted, thus representing a rough approximation in terms of a lower threshold. 
However, it is argued in literature, that to demonstrate preference reversals, it is not necessary to find 
the true WTP or cash equivalent as long as the ordering remains the same that is possible under much 
weaker conditions (e.g. Tversky and Thaler 1990). In the second part of the experiment, subjects were 
asked to indicate which of the two products in each category they would prefer when one would be 
provided as a gift. Finally, subjects were presented with three binding purchase decisions. Participants 
had to indicate in each category, which product (if any) they would buy when both were equally 
priced. Prices of the products were determined by the lowest cash equivalent that a subject revealed in 
each category during the monadic evaluation in the first part. 
 Since a within-subject design was used to identify preference reversals on an individual level, 
we had to avoid memory-based decision-making because subjects are evidentially known to try to 
avoid inconsistent behavior (Park and Hastak 1994). Therefore, participants were presented with a 
variety of hypothetical choices and evaluations (e.g. purchase likelihoods, price consciousness) and 
open questions (e.g. brand associations) about products of the categories under test during intervals 
between the three parts of study one. At the end, the experimenter determined the binding decision by 
drawing a ball with a number from a bingo cage. If a decision number from the monadic evaluation 
part was drawn, subjects either received an amount of cash or a product. If a purchase decision was 
drawn, subjects were obliged to pay the price of the selected product with their own money for 
receiving it except for those who chose the no-buy option in that particular decision. If one of the 
decisions on gifts was drawn, subjects received a free sample of the chosen product.  
Results
A preference reversal can be inferred from the data in the following way. The first part elicited 
individual cash equivalents separately for each of the six products under test whereas in experimental 
part two and three, subjects chose between two competing products when they could receive one for 
free as a gift or when products were offered for purchase at equal prices. Following standard theory of 
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rational choice, one would expect subjects to prefer the product as a gift or buy the product which 
gains the higher cash equivalent in part one. Thus, whenever a subject provided a higher cash 
equivalent for a particular product in part one but chose a different product in a later part, this behavior 
is considered a preference reversal. Consequently, whenever a subject provided the same cash 
equivalent for both products in part one, a preference reversal cannot occur. However, participants 
with identical cash equivalents were considered a valid case and their choices were included in further 
analysis similar to analysis procedures in recent research on PR (Braga, Humphrey and Starmer 2009).  
 Analysis shows that when looking at all choice tasks, almost half of the participants (48 
percent) reverse their decision at least once in the experiment (see table 1). Thus, results confirm that 
the preference reversal phenomenon generalizes to risk-free decisions between real products when 
subjects face consequences of their decisions in a laboratory environment. The rate of reversals is 
similar to the rates found in earlier research on risky choices (generally between 20 and 50 percent). 
Moreover, 24 out of 58 subjects reverse their preference comparing cash-equivalents from part one 
and choices without prices (decision on gifts) in part two, while 20 out of 58 participants reverse their 
preference in the binding purchase decision of part three.  
Table 1 Number of Preference Reversals in Study One 
Decision no PR 1 x PR  2 x PR  3 x PR PR/n Percentage 
Overall 31 10 17 1 28/58 48% 
Decisions on Gift 34 22 2 0 24/58 41% 
Decisions on Purchase 38 19 1 0 20/58 34% 
 Looking at each product category separately, one can find high percentages of reversals for 
toothpastes and shampoos for decisions on gift as well as purchases whereas subjects reverse their 
preference for chocolate bars less frequently (see table 2). Note that subjects who chose the no-buy 
option in the third part of the experiment were excluded from calculations of rates of reversals in 
buying decisions. Specifically, we detected more than 20 percent reversals in buying decisions on 
shampoos and toothpastes while only one out of ten subjects reversed her preference in purchases of 
chocolate bars. From our point of view, and in accordance to statements of participants after the 
experiment, category-specific differences in the rates of reversals could be traced back to distinct 
preference structures with respect to the particular chocolate bars under test. As can be seen in the 
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lower section of table two, we observed a strong preference for brand A in terms of a high fraction of 
subjects who revealed the larger cash equivalent for this brand (92 percent). Moreover, as to the 
elicited cash equivalent values of these subjects, the mean of brand A (CEA=59 Cent) considerably 
exceeds the mean of brand B (CEA=28 Cent) by a factor of 2.1, hence indicating a noticeably larger 
relative price tolerance between brands for this category than for shampoos (factor 1.2) and 
toothpastes (1.6). Thus, individuals’ preference orders between the particular brands of chocolate bars 
can reasonably be assumed to be more stable, hence reducing the magnitude of preference reversals 
significantly.  
Table 2 Occurrence of Preference Reversals in Study One 
 Chocolate Bars Shampoos Toothpaste 
 Monadic Evaluation Monadic Evaluation Monadic Evaluation 
n=58 A B E n=58 A B E n=58 A B E 
CEA 59 21 34 CEA 198 168 169 CEA 120 71 59 
CEB 28 36 34 CEB 171 199 169 CEB 76 92 59 
A 81 3 5 A 26 7 17 A 61 12 5
B 9 2 0 B 7 36 7 B 7 10 5 
Competitive 
Choice (Gift) 
PA=PB=0 PR 12% PR 14% PR 19% 
 Monadic Evaluation Monadic Evaluation Monadic Evaluation 
n=49a A B E n=29a A B E n=47a A B E 
CEA 59 22 29 CEA 206 167 187 CEA 120 66 59 
CEB 28 42 29 CEB 177 202 187 CEB 73 85 59 
A 84 2 4 A 24 7 14 A 62 11 7
B 8 2 0 B 14 38 3 B 11 4 5 
Competitive 
Choice (Buy) 
PA=PB=
Min[CEA;CEB]
PR 10% PR 21% PR 22% 
a
E
CEA,B
= subjects who chose the no-buy option were excluded from analysis 
= percentage of subjects with equal cash equivalents for products (A; B) 
= (Mean) Cash Equivalent for Brand A, B (in Cent)        
4 Study Two 
Experimental design 
In a within-subject design, a sample of 183 frequent and experienced buyers of a fast-moving 
consumer good category (chocolate hazelnut spread) was recruited in a local store of a German retail 
chain. Subjects were offered the two top brands (Nutella vs. Nusspli) at two separate sales stands 
located near of the entrance of the store. The experiment was run as a computer-aided personal 
interview (CAPI) and consisted of three parts and 22 relevant decisions in total. Before the survey 
started, participants were informed about the application of a random payoff mechanism and binding 
consequences in terms of potential buying obligations depending on their decisions during the survey. 
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The monadic evaluation part consisted of ten choices for each brand under test. In contrast to study 
one, subjects were presented with one of the spreads and had to indicate whether they would buy it at 
several test prices around the market price or not (no-buy option). Hence, consumers’ product values 
in terms of a willingness to pay were elicited in a closed-ended (referendum) approach. Again, in the 
sequence of prices as well as the order of brands, subjects were presented with varied and random 
input in each interview. In the second (third) part of the experiment, participants were asked to 
indicate which of the two products, if any they would purchase when both were equally priced at the 
minimum (maximum) WTP subjects revealed for a brand in part one. Again, to avoid memory-based 
decision-making, participants were presented with a variety of hypothetical choices and evaluations 
during the intervals between the three parts of the field experiment. Any transactions were realized 
immediately after determining the binding decision at the end of the experiment. Subjects had to pay 
the price of a selected product for receiving it with their own money or could not buy any of the 
brands when the no-buy option was chosen. Thus, consumers’ decisions were observed in an 
experimental field environment that relates close to regular buying decisions subjects face in real in-
store purchases.
Results
According to our analysis, we find strong support for the occurrence of preference reversals even in 
risk-free binding buying decisions between real brands at the point of purchase. A total of thirty 
subjects of the sample reversed their preference at least once in competitive decisions (17 percent). 
Moreover, seven percent of all participants switched from the brand they evaluated higher in the 
monadic WTP elicitation to the other spread in both buying decisions in the competitive choice part. 
After excluding participants who chose the no-buy option, we observed a nineteen (fourteen) percent 
rate of reversals when brands are offered at the minimum (maximum) WTP subjects revealed in 
monadic judgments (see table 3). Thus, a substantial violation of procedure invariance is detected 
again. Furthermore, in comparison to buying decisions between shampoos and toothpastes in the 
laboratory-based study one, we find similar rates of reversals in consumers’ decisions between spreads 
at the point of purchase.  
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Table 3 Occurrence of Preference Reversals in Study Two 
 Chocolate Hazelnut Spreads 
 Monadic Evaluation 
n=105a A B E 
WTPA 204 142 207 
WTPB 154 174 207 
A 56 6 20
B 8 3 7 
Competitive Choice (Buy) 
PA=PB=MAX[WTPA;WTPB]
PR 14% 
 Monadic Evaluation 
n=153a A B E 
WTPA 216 142 207 
WTPB 157 175 207 
A 59 6 14
B 13 3 5 
Competitive Choice (Buy) 
PA=PB=MIN[WTPA;WTPB]
PR 19% 
a
E
WTPA,B
= subjects who chose the no-buy option were excluded from analysis 
= percentage of subjects with equal WTP for products (A; B) 
= (Mean) Willingness To Pay for Brand A, B (in Cent)
5 Conclusion
The main question our study examines is whether the preference reversal phenomenon known from 
risk research persists when experienced consumers evaluate and choose real products from different 
category subsets in market-like settings. According to our results, robustness of preference reversals is 
confirmed for both laboratory environments as well as field experiments at the point of purchase. 
Subjects change their preference between products to a substantial extent depending on whether 
monadic or competitive elicitation designs are applied. Thus, procedure invariance as one of the main 
assumptions of standard utility theory is violated in risk-free decisions, hence raising doubt as to what 
extent individuals do in fact have an underlying set of stable preferences between alternatives in 
general.
 Moreover, basic research on the validity of different WTP-measurements has to address this 
violation, when discussing advantages and disadvantages of monadic and competitive designs in 
general. Firstly, regarding the literature on pricing research, especially the monadic BDM mechanism 
is meant to be an appropriate procedure for determining approximations of the true point-of-purchase 
WTP (Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002, Voelckner 2006). But to the extent that preference reversals 
occur in real purchase decisions where generally several products compete for consumers’ demand 
simultaneously, predictions based on product values that were elicited in monadic designs could be 
substantially misleading. On the supposition that reversals are in fact induced by different elicitation 
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procedures, a closer examination of WTP-measurements based on competitive designs that apparently 
relate near marketplace scenarios is suggested. Secondly, it is noteworthy that in our field experiment 
(study two) we found a substantial proportion of subjects who refused to buy any of the products in 
competitive decisions. That means that 43 percent (16 percent) of the participants chose the no-buy 
option in the competitive choice tasks although products under test were offered at the maximum 
(minimum) reservation price they revealed in the monadic evaluation beforehand. Apparently, an 
overestimation of consumers’ WTP elicited in monadic evaluations is detected. Again, as a 
consequence, further research should investigate WTP-measurements and robustness of preference 
orders based on competitive designs such as the brand-price-trade-off approach or choice-based 
conjoint analysis more intensively which have been neglected to some extent in recent pricing research 
(Voelckner 2006).
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Notes
1 In general, higher prices are assumed to affect net utilities and purchase probabilities 
negatively. However, to the extent that consumers perceive price not only as a financial 
burden but also as a quality cue, net utilities are positively as well as negatively correlated 
with price information (Voelckner and Hofmann 2007).  
1 In contrast, more recent experimental results show that continued market exposure does not 
necessarily promote consistency with standard utility theory (Braga, Humphrey and Starmer 
2009).
2 Laboratory “MaXLab” at the Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg. Students were 
recruited using the online recruitment program ORSEE (Greiner 2004). 
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